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INTRODUCTION

Prior to the entry of MCI into the long-distance
market in 1969, AT&T supplied virtually all longdistance calling in the United States, as well as the
predominant share of local exchange services. Accordingly, AT&T was subjected to traditional monopoly regulation by both federal and state regula* Torchmark Professor of Economics, Auburn University.
Ph.D., Economics, University of Florida, 1976.
** Professor of Economics, University of Tennessee, Ph.D.,
Economics, Washington University, 1982. An earlier version of
this article was submitted by AT&T to the Federal Communications Commission on June 12, 1995, as an ex parte presentation
in CC Docket No. 79-252.
1 In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive
Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, Notice
of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979);
First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980); Second Report
and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59 (1982); Order on Recon., 93
F.C.C.2d 54 (1983); Policy Statement and Third Report and
Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791 (1983); Fourth Report and Order,
95 F.C.C.2d 554 (1983), vacated and remanded, AT&T v.
FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
3020 (1993); Fifth Report and Order,98 F.C.C.2d 1191 (1984);
Sixth Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020 (1985), vacated and

tory authorities. As the number of interexchange
carriers grew, however, the question of whether and
how these new entrants into the long-distance market should be regulated arose. In 1980, in the Competitive Carrier Proceeding,' the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission")
resolved the issue by adopting a policy which classified firms according to their ability to adversely afremanded, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d
1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Competitive Carrier Proceeding]. AT&T filed a motion in this docket to have its classification changed from a dominant carrier to a non-dominant carrier. Motion for Reclassification of AT&T as a Nondominant
Carrier, in CC Dkt. No. 79-252 (Sept. 22, 1993); Ex Parte
Presentation in Support of AT&T's Motion for Reclassification
as a Non-Dominant Carrier, in CC Dkt. No. 79-252 (Apr. 24,
1995) [hereinafter Ex Parte Presentation] (reasserting the motion). On October 12, 1995, the FCC decided that it would now
treat AT&T as a nondominant carrier for regulatory purposes.
In re Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier, Order, in CC Dkt. No. 79-252, FCC 95-427
(Oct. 23, 1995) [hereinafter AT&T Non-Dominant Order]. See
also Doug Abrahms, FCC Frees AT&T from Some Restrictions, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at B8; Ruling Makes Phone
Rivalry Keener, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 13, 1995, at B-1.
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fect market prices.' Specifically, firms with significant market power were to be classified as
"dominant," while firms without such power were to
be classified as "nondominant." Of particular importance, considerably more regulatory oversight and
controls were imposed on any firms judged to be
"dominant."'
When the FCC adopted this "dominant firm" system of regulation, AT&T was one of a very small
number of long-distance firms competing in the
United States. It supplied over ninety percent of the
long-distance traffic, owned or operated nearly 100
percent of the transmission facilities used to carry
long-distance calls, and enjoyed a unique dialing advantage over other long-distance competitors. Most
importantly, in 1980, AT&T maintained control
over the local exchange bottleneck facilities through
which virtually all long-distance calls pass. In light
of these market conditions, the FCC chose to classify
AT&T as a dominant firm and put in place a regulatory apparatus designed to control the exercise of
AT&T's perceived market power.
Today's long-distance market is vastly different
from that of fifteen years ago. The 1984 divestiture
of the Bell operating companies eliminated AT&T's
control of local exchange bottleneck facilities.'
AT&T is now one of over 450 interexchange companies vying for the patronage of long-distance customers.' Moreover, as the number of competitors has
grown, AT&T's share of long-distance transmission
' Competitive Carrier Proceeding, First Report and Order,
supra note 1.
' The general policy of applying different regulatory constraints to firms competing within the same market is known as
"asymmetric regulation" and has been the subject of some criticism. See, e.g., FCC, OPP WORKING PAPER 14, IMPLICATIONS
OF ASYMMETRIC REGULATION FOR COMPETITION POLICY
ANALYSIS (authored by John R. Haring) (1984); David L.

Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Market Based Regulation of a
Quasi-Monopoly: A Transition Policy for Telecommunications,
15 POL'Y STUD. J. 395 (1987). Asymmetric regulatory controls
over the "dominant" firm have continued until very recently,
even though traditional rate-of-return regulation of AT&T was
replaced by price cap regulation in 1989. In re Policies and
Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Report and Order and Second Further Notice, 4 FCC Rcd. 2873 (1989), re-

considered, 6 FCC Rcd. 665 (1991), remanded sub. nom.
AT&T v. FCC, 974 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Thus, the
change to price cap regulation did not signal an end to asymmetric regulation.
" See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Corp., 552 F.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aftd sub nom. Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
1 FCC, CC, INDUSTRY ANALYSIS Div., TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE (1995) [hereinafter TELEPHONE TRENDS].
1
FCC, CC, INDUSTRY ANALYSIS DIV., FIBER DEPLOY-
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capacity has shrunk to some forty to forty-five percent, 6 while its share of interstate minutes-of-use has
fallen to fifty-eight percent. Indeed, MCI, Sprint
and LDDS/Wiltel now have sufficient capacity in
place to absorb thirty-two percent of AT&T's remaining share of the market within three months.'
The degree and intensity of rivalry among long-distance firms also has increased commensurate with
the growth of competitors in the long-distance market. In 1994, a typical American household received
some 330 advertising contacts from long-distance
companies.' The result of this heightened rivalry has
been falling prices, improved quality, and an everexpanding choice of innovative long-distance services.
Due to these changes in the long-distance market,
the FCC has reclassified AT&T as a nondominant
carrier. This reclassification, however, does not completely eradicate asymmetric regulation. Though the
FCC declared that it was not the determinative consideration, AT&T has agreed to be bound by several
residual controls which do not apply to its competitors.1" For example, AT&T will provide a fifteen
percent discount to low-income consumers for a period of three years." Other constraints were negotiated for low-volume residential customers and for
800 directory assistance service. 2 AT&T is also required to notify the Commission five days in advance
of residential rate increases above certain levels." In
addition, the Commission declined to extend the nondominant classification to AT&T's international serMENT UPDATE, END OF YEAR

1993 (1994) [hereinafter

FIBER

DEPLOYMENT UPDATE].
7 FCC, CC, INDUSTRY ANALYSIS DIv., LONG DISTANCE
MARKET SHARES: FIRST QUARTER 1995 Tbl. 3 (1995) [herein-

after MARKET SHARES].
o T.L. Brand et al., An Updated Study of AT&T's Competitors Capacity to Absorb Rapid Demand Growth, in Ex Parte
Presentation, supra note 1, Att. B.
" Letter from C.L. Ward, AT&T, to William F. Caton,
Acting Secretary, FCC, in CC Dkt. Nos. 79-252, 93-197, and
80-286 (Mar. 9, 1995), in Ex Parte Presentation,supra note 1,
Att. S.
10 AT&T Non-Dominant Order, supra note 1, para. 37.
AT&T suggested these "voluntary" commitments in a series of
ex parte letters to the Commission. See Letter from R. Gerard
Salemme, Vice President of Governmental Affairs, AT&T, to
Kathleen M.H. Wallman, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau,
FCC, in CC Dkt. No. 79-252 (Sept. 21, 1995); Letter from R.
Gerard Salemme, V.P.-Gov. Affairs, AT&T, to Kathleen M.H.
Wallman, Chief, CC, FCC, in CC Dkt. No. 79-252 (Oct. 5,
1995).
"
AT&T Non-Dominant Order, supra note 1, para. 84.
Is For example, low-volume residential customers will have
a guaranteed rate, set at three dollars per month for the first 20
minutes of service during the first year. Id. para. 85.
is Id. para. 86.
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vices. 14 Further, fifteen state regulatory commissions
still continue to employ asymmetric regulation of
intrastate long-distance calling." Thus, while it
appears that asymmetric regulation of AT&T has
ended, in fact it has not quite yet.
In light of these developments, it is appropriate, if
not long overdue, to examine the issue of whether
AT&T should continue to be subjected to any form
of asymmetric regulation by the FCC or state regulatory commissions. Our purpose, then, is to examine
whether AT&T has market power in today's market
and whether any economic rationale exists for regulating AT&T's services differentially from its competitors. This examination is greatly facilitated by
the publication of several empirical studies of the
post-divestiture long-distance market and by a
wealth of evidence that has accumulated at the state
level over the past decade as individual state regulatory commissions have introduced more relaxed regulation and eliminated asymmetric regulatory policies. In this article, we will draw heavily upon both
of these important sources of information.
Our approach is three-pronged. First, relying on
the conventional tools of industrial organization/antitrust analysis, we assess whether AT&T has sufficient unilateral market power to warrant its continued classification as "dominant." Second, we review
a complementary body of direct and indirect empirical evidence pertaining to the question of AT&T's
market power. Finally, we examine a set of miscellaneous "competitive" issues that surround the question of "dominance." These issues initially arose at
the state level and, for the most part, were resolved
as many states have now moved to end asymmetric
regulation in their long-distance markets.
On the basis of this analysis, as well as the other
evidence examined herein, this paper concludes that
AT&T does not possess the control over pricing or
competitors that initially gave rise to its classification
as a "dominant" carrier. As a result, neither consumers nor the tax-paying public are well served by
the perpetuation of asymmetric dominant firm regu14 Id. para. 2. The Commission is also poised to begin a new
proceeding on the entire interexchange marketplace to determine

appropriate industry-wide regulation. Id. Thus, despite the sig-

nificance of this Commission action, it remains to be seen
whether it will lead to true deregulation of the interexchange
market.
"
The FCC has lagged behind many state regulatory commissions in eliminating asymmetric regulation of long-distance
carriers, as currently 35 states regulate all interexchange carriers
equally. Letter from Alex J. Mandl, Exec. V.P., AT&T, to the

Hon. Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, FCC (Nov. 17, 1994), in Ex
Parte Presentation; supra note 1, Att. U (Status of Regulatory

lation of AT&T. Specifically, an examination of
standard market power criteria used in antitrust
analyses provides compelling evidence that AT&T
does not possess significant market power but,
rather, faces effective competition from both existing
and potential competitors. Moreover, an abundant
amount of evidence drawn from other independent
analyses of this market, as well as state and federal
experimentation with relaxed regulation, provide
further corroboration that AT&T faces effective
competition. Finally, an examination of several auxiliary issues that have periodically surfaced regarding the merits of relaxed regulation reveal that the
regulatory commissions can safely and confidently
remove the dominant firm regulation governing
AT&T.
II. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR
TRADITIONAL REGULATION AND THE
CRITERIA FOR RELAXED REGULATION
The entire post-divestiture period has been characterized by asymmetric regulation of AT&T at the
federal level, on the grounds that it is "dominant."
All other interexchange
carriers are classified as
"nondominant." 6 In order for the FCC (or any regulatory agency) to establish and maintain the "dominant" classification of a firm, it is necessary first to
define what is meant by this term. Economically, a
firm is considered to be dominant if it possesses significant monopoly power.17 Alternatively, a
nondominant firm can be said to be subject to effective competition.
This economic definition is entirely consistent with
the regulatory definition of dominance first adopted
by the FCC in 1980 in the Competitive Carrier Proceeding. The FCC stated that a dominant firm is one
with "substantial opportunity and incentive to subsidize the rates for more competitive services with revenues obtained from its monopoly or near-monopoly
services."1 8 The order further said that a nondominant firm is one without sufficient market power to
Rules and Regulations of AT&T by Jurisdiction). Of these
states, only three continue to regulate AT&T's earnings. Id.
Thus, while 32 states have already implemented symmetric reg-

ulation without earnings constraints, AT&T is still hampered in
substantial portions of the country. Id.
"'

Competitive Carrier Proceeding, First Report and Order,

supra note 1, para. 27.
17 See generally F.M.

SCHERER,

INDUSTRIAL

MARKET

(2d ed. 1980).
" Competitive Carrier Proceeding, First Report and Order,
supra note 1, para. 15 (emphasis added). The Commission also
noted that a carrier would be classified as "dominant if it has
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
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"sustain prices either unreasonably above or below
costs."' 9 Thus, the concept of market power provides
the cornerstone of the FCC's classification system.
The question then, is how to determine whether a
firm possesses a significant amount of market
power.2" A prerequisite to analyzing market power
is to define the relevant market for the firm's product
or products. If markets are defined either too broadly
or too narrowly, it is likely that the standard market
power criteria will provide misleading information. 2
The market definition process requires the delineation of a set of boundaries in both geographic and
product space within which the market price is determined. A relevant market is a set of buyers and
sellers whose purchase and production decisions establish the price at which the product or service is
sold.
The economic criteria used to delineate market
boundaries are built upon product and geographic
substitutability on both the demand and supply sides
of the market. 2 In general, the greater the degree of
supply-side or demand-side substitutability, the
broader the relevant market.2" In the case of longdistance telecommunications, the high degree of supply-side substitutability across services indicates that
the relevant product market includes all interexchange toll services. Firms currently providing any
one of the toll services (e.g., Message Telephone Service ("MTS")) could very easily begin to provide
other toll services (e.g., Wide Area Telephone Service ("WATS")). Thus, the relevant product market
to examine, and upon which to base policy, is the set
24
of all interexchange services.

Similarly, the high degree of substitutability of
vendors across geographic regions indicates that, as
acknowledged by the FCC, the relevant geographic
market encompasses the entire United States. 25 This
determination is underscored by the fact that interexchange carriers with a point-of-presence ("POP")
market power (i.e. power to control price)." Id. para. 26.
19

Id.

20
This question, of course, has a long tradition in the economics of antitrust. For a more detailed discussion of the economics of monopoly power and effective competition see DAVID
L. KASERMAN & JOHN W. MAYO, GOVERNMENT AND BusiNESS: THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION ch. 4
(1995).
"' Although the market definition issue is one that can lead
to errors in market power analysis, it is conceptually possible to
err in the market definition analysis and still perform an evaluation of market power that yields correct outcomes. See William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981). As a practical matter,
however, one is far more likely to get the economics right if the

[Vol. 4

in any local access transport area ("LATA") may
supply originating service to any end office in that
LATA by ordering access from the local exchange
company. Accordingly, market coverage extends
across both urban and rural areas, all of which are
accessible simply by purchasing local exchange company access. Application of the standard economic
criteria used to delineate market boundaries leads to
the conclusion that the relevant market is all interexchange services sold in the United States.
This finding is extremely important for regulatory
purposes. Where regulatory policy is founded upon
the intensity of competition within the regulated
firm's market or markets, determination of the correct market boundaries becomes crucial for two reasons. First, as noted above, market definition is a
prerequisite to an accurate evaluation of market
power. An inaccurate conclusion regarding market
power is likely to result if an inaccurate market definition is employed. Erring in the direction of defining the market too narrowly generally tends to bias
the analysis toward a finding of significant market
power. An overly narrow market definition can result in an unwarranted conclusion that substantial
market power is present.
Second, whether the regulated firm operates
within a single market or multiple markets determines whether regulatory constraints should apply to
the firm's overall operations or be tailored to those
subsets of the firm's outputs that constitute separate
markets. Where the firm sells its output within a
single overall product market, a policy that applies
different regulatory policies to different services
within that market can have serious adverse consequences. Specifically, regulating one part of a market
differently from other parts of the same market can
distort market signals and create opportunities for
strategic and inefficient uses of regulatory authority
by competitors.2
market is correctly defined.
22
For a more detailed discussion of the market definition
exercise see KASERMAN & MAYO, supra note 20, at 111-16.
Because substitutability on either side of the market will
significantly influence the price that is established, market
boundaries are determined by the greatest degree of substitutability found - whether it is on the demand side or the
supply side of the market.
24 For an example of the wide acceptance of this broad product market definition see Competitive Carrier Proceeding,
Fourth Report and Order, supra note 1, para. 13 (stating that
"interstate, domestic interexchange telecommunications services
comprise the relevant product market").
2"

25

Id.

26

For a discussion on the strategic use of antitrust concerns
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Once the relevant market has been determined,
three fundamental factors are typically used to evaluate the extent to which any given firm in that market is subject to effective competition: the supply responsiveness (or elasticity) of other firms, market
demand characteristics, and market share characteristics. Indeed, both academic literature and public
policy bodies have widely acknowledged the relevance of these criteria in the assessment of market
power.2 7 Information on these three factors allows
policymakers to reach informed judgments regarding
the extent of competition in the market. As competition emerges, the need for traditional regulation
wanes and, where effective competition is found to
exist, a complete elimination of direct regulation is
warranted. 8 In the paragraphs that follow, we
briefly examine the role each of these economic characteristics plays in determining whether a firm possesses significant market power.
First, consider the role of the supply elasticity of
competing firms. Any firm contemplating a price increase above the competitive level must consider the
extent to which such an increase will encourage increased sales by its competitors. Business lost to these
other firms will exert downward pressure on market
price, thereby reducing (or, in some cases, completely
eliminating or even reversing) the potential gains
from the contemplated price increase. Thus, in a
market where other firms can promptly meet customer demand by expanding their service availability
in response to a competitor's price increase, every
firm faces effective competition because any attempt
to increase price to supra-competitive leels will be
defeated by a substantial loss of sales to competitors.
Just as a firm must consider the supply response
of firms already in the market, it must also consider
the response of firms that are not currently providing
service to this market but which could begin serving
it if additional profit incentives were created by an
increase in the market price.2 9 Incumbent producers
must recognize the response of potential competitors
as well as current competitors in evaluating their
ability to raise prices. As a result, in situations

where new firms can readily enter the market and
capture sales, other firms' supply responsiveness to
price changes may be quite high even if there is a
limited number of firms currently serving the market.8 0 Incumbent suppliers still face effective competition in this situation because any attempt to raise
prices above the competitive level will result in the
entry of additional firms with a corresponding increase in supply. Thus, an assessment of entry and
expansion conditions in the relevant market is a critical part of the overall assessment of competition in a
market.
Second, market demand characteristics play an
important role in determining the market power of a
firm. At the most basic level, the price elasticity of
total market demand affects the extent of any firm's
market power. Specifically, the more elastic the market demand, the more consumers view other goods
and services (or reduced purchases of the service in
question) as viable alternatives. As a result, a highly
elastic market demand will limit substantially the
extent of any firm's market power. Attempts to increase price will result in significant losses in sales as
consumers switch to substitute goods or services or
simply purchase fewer units.
In addition to market demand elasticity, three
other characteristics of demand help to determine
whether a given firm possesses market power: market growth, the distribution of demand, and the willingness of consumers to switch suppliers. First,
ceteris paribus, growing markets are more likely to
attract entry than stagnant or declining markets. 8
Market growth reduces the likelihood of firm failures, and in turn lessens potential entrants' vulnerability. The heightened threat of entry and expansion
in rapidly growing markets thus acts to restrict incumbent firms' ability to raise prices to above-com2

to hamper competitive market processes see William J. Baumol
& Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition,
28 J. L. & EcoN. 247, 257-58 (1985).
7 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 938-63;

IS
Indirect regulation in the form of constraints provided by
antitrust laws, of course, remains.
" Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 938-63.
80 Id. at 950.
8 See, e.g., J.C. Hause & G. Du Rietz, Entry, Industry
Growth and the Microdynamics of Industry Supply, 92 J. POL.

Simran K. Kahai, David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Is the

Dominant Firm Dominant? An Empirical Analysis of AT&T's
Market Power,J. L. & ECON. (forthcoming 1996). See also
In re Revisions to Price Cap Rules for AT&T Corp., Report
and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 3009, para. 16 (1995) [hereinafter
AT&T Price Cap Order] (applying these same criteria to the
case of commercial long-distance services).

petitive levels.

3

Next, in markets with a highly skewed demand
distribution (i.e., a small proportion of customers accounts for a large portion of total demand), firms
with high market shares have fewer opportunities to
engage in supra-competitive pricing, because the rel-

EcoN. 733, 734-47 (1984).

"" Note, though, that rapidly expanding demand may exert
upward pressure on prices in the most competitive of markets.
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS ch. 5 (1993).
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atively few customers that account for a large share
of the business being generated have a strong incentive to seek out alternative suppliers if their current
provider raises prices. 8 The fear of losing a significant amount of business drives firms to charge competitive prices to these large customers, who, themselves may become competitors through resale.
Similarly, a relatively skewed demand sends important signals to the various competitors that rapid
market share gains (losses) are possible through efficient (inefficient) performance and pricing. This
heightened vulnerability reduces incumbent firms'
market power and lowers the likelihood that they
would exercise any residual market power they
might possess.
The willingness or reluctance of consumers to
switch vendors of a good or service is also a fundamental consideration in analyzing a firm's ability to
raise prices to supra-competitive levels. When a
given firm's customers are relatively unwilling or
unable to switch suppliers regardless of price, the
firm in question has more latitude to raise price to
the detriment of consumers. Alternatively, if consumers are willing and able to switch vendors, a firm
will have considerably less latitude to unilaterally
raise prices above competitive levels.
The third set of criteria traditionally used to examine market power revolve around market share.
Ceteris paribus, a firm with a large market share
could, by withholding some given portion of its output from the market, have a larger impact on total
market supply and, hence, price than a firm with a
small market share."' The measurement and interpretation of market share for the interexchange industry, however, must be approached with caution.
The level and time path of AT&T's market share
reflect not only normal marketplace developments
but also the fact that AT&T was "endowed" with a
very high market share at the time of the divesti-

ture."5 That endowment, however, did not ensure
that AT&T would have monopoly control over the
supply of long-distance services. Thus, the information that, in some cases, might be contained in a
market share number at a specific point in time is
diluted substantially by the fact that AT&T began
the post-divestiture period with an inherited high
share. The competitive significance of a market share
number, however, stems from a firm's ability (or
lack thereof) to retain a given market share in the
wake of an attempt to raise prices to above-competitive levels.3 6 Firms whose market share declines over
time in a market with stable (or falling) prices are
very unlikely to have significant market power.
In this context, the presence of a high market
share at a given point in time provides virtually no
information on the incumbent firm's vulnerability to
market share losses. Accordingly, any analysis of
market share should examine the dynamic path of a
firm's market share over time. Where the analysis
reveals substantial market share losses, the observed
vulnerability indicates significant limits on the firm's
market power, regardless of the current level of its
(statically-measured) market share. This is particularly true if significant price increases have not occurred. If the firm's market share has been vulnerable in the absence of substantial price increases, then
it is extremely unlikely that the firm will be able to
sustain its share in the presence of a significant price
increase. The ability to maintain market share in the
presence of a significant price increase is a true measure of market power.
Further, although minutes-of-use and revenuebased market share statistics are more readily available, in the case of the long-distance services market it
is more meaningful to review market share measures
based on the relative amount of transmission capacities held by interexchange firms. Capacity-based
market share figures, combined with information on

For empirical evidence that buyer concentration tends to
promote more competitive pricing see Steven H. Lustgarten, The

nies, it will be unable either to subsidize the prices of its
interexchange service with revenues from local exchange
services or to shift costs from competitive interexchange

Impact of Buyer Concentrationin Manufacturing Industries,57
REV. EcON. & STAT. 125 (1975); Peter R. Cowley, Business
Margins and Buyer/Seller Power, 68 REV. EcON. & STAT. 333

(1986).
"" Whether such withholding of supply by a single firm will
have a significant effect on market price also depends upon the
other determinants of market power discussed in this section,

such as the supply response of other firms.
" This "endowment" of a large market share did no, however, mean that AT&T was "endowed" with significant market
power. Indeed, Judge Greene, who oversaw the divestiture of
AT&T, concluded that:
[o]nce AT&T is divested of the local Operating Compa-

services ...

[w]ith the removal of these barriers to compe-

tition, AT&T should be unable to engage in monopoly
pricing in any market.
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Corp., 552 F. Supp. 131,
172 (D.D.C. 1982), aftd sub nom. Maryland v. United States,
460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
" "The right question is that of what happens to share, or,
more generally, to a firm's business when monopoly profits are
sought. The fundamental issue is whether competitors are able
to grow." FRANKLIN FISHER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, EcONOMICS, AND THE LAW

15 (1991).
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customers' willingness to switch suppliers, 8 reveal
whether existing firms can rapidly expand output or
service availability in response to an attempted price
increase. Consequently, capacity-based market
shares are a more accurate indicator of the market's
ability to enforce competitive pricing behavior."8
It is important to understand that a firm cannot
hold significant market power unless it has a large
market share and other firms' supply responsiveness
is low. That is, either a low market share or a high
responsiveness of other firms' supply to price
changes means that the firm is facing effective competition. If market share is low, significant market
power cannot exist even if the responsiveness of
other firms' supply to price changes is limited. Conversely, where other firms' supply is highly responsive to price changes, an individual firm cannot possess significant market power even if it holds a very
high share.
The consequent need to examine both entry/expansion conditions and market share characteristics
has been emphasized repeatedly by antitrust enforcement agencies.8 9 State regulatory commissions also
have recognized the importance of entry conditions
and the corresponding need to look beyond market
share figures in evaluating the intensity of competi-

tion. For example, the Virginia State Corporation
Commission substantially reduced its regulation of
interexchange carriers in 1984, reasoning that "the
threat of competition is, in itself, a potent check on a
firm's pricing policies."' 0 Additional state-level recognition of the role of entry conditions in market
power assessments is provided by the ongoing monitoring process by the California Public Utilities
Commission of the intrastate interexchange marketplace. Their most recent assessment concludes that
"[there are no significant barriers to entry that
would discourage companies from competing in the
California Interexchange market, and there are no
barriers to exit.""' Thus, many state commissions
have correctly incorporated the role of entry conditions in their evaluations of market power.
Totally specious conclusions may be reached if entry and expansion conditions are ignored and focus is
placed solely on market share. It is necessary to look
beyond market share." While market share is one of
the economic determinants of market power, it cannot by itself demonstrate that a firm has significant
control over market price. The other economic determinants, such as entry conditions, must also be conducive to providing such control.

" Consumers' high willingness to switch carriers is addressed infra at notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
" "Analytically, capacity seems to be the correct choice. The
power of the dominant firm is limited not by the amount its
competitors are currently manufacturing but by the amount they
could manufacture in response to the dominant firm's price increase." Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Analysis of Market
Power, with Some Thoughts About Regulated Industries, in

62 PUR4th 245, 256 (1984). In a similar vein, the West Virginia Public Service Commission wrote in 1986 that:
We realize that AT&T does enjoy a large share of the
interLATA toll market; however, market share in and of
itself is not the only criterion to be considered for regulatory purposes. Indeed we consider ease of entry, availability of customer choices and the presence of alternate carriers to be more important factors.
In re MCI Telecomm. Corp., Generic Order, 75 PUR4th 487,
498 (1986).
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7 (John R. Allison & Dennis L.

Thomas eds. 1990).
" For example, the Federal Trade Commission has stated:
Ideally, if we could measure all relevant demand and supply elasticities, we could arrive at relatively precise estimates of market power. Such evidence, however, is rarely,
if ever, available and is not readily susceptible to direct
measurement. Therefore, other criteria must be utilized.
The most probative criteria include entry barriers; concentration trends (including volatility of market shares); technological change; demand trends; and market definition..
• [tihe issue of entry barriers is perhaps the most important qualitative factor, for if entry barriers are very low it
is unlikely that market power, whether individually or
collectively exercised, will persist for long.
FEDERAL

TRADE

COMMISSION,

STATEMENT

CONCERNING

at
20,902 (1993).
40
Re SouthernTel of Va., Inc., Final Order and Opinion,
HORIZONTAL MERGERS, TRADE

REG.

REPORTS 20,901,

41
CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, THE COMM'N. ADVISORY AND
COMPLIANCE Div., REPORT ON 1992 CALIFORNIA INTEREXCHANGE MARKET (1995).
"" Almost a half a century ago, Nobel Laureate Paul Samu-

elson noted that:
[t]he demand curve of any firm is equal to the demand
curve of the industry minus the supply curve of the remaining firms, already in the industry or potentially
therein. This being the case, it is easy to show that under
uniform constant costs the demand curve for a firm is horizontal even though it produces 99.9 per cent of all that is
sold ... [e]conomically if the firm were to begin to restrict
output so as to gain monopoly profit, it would cease to see
99.9 per cent of the output or even anything at all. Consequently, it would not attempt to do so, but would find its
maximum advantage in behaving like a pure competitor.
A. SAMUELSON,
ANALYSIS 79 (1947).
PAUL
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III. APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITIVE
CRITERIA TO THE INTEREXCHANGE SERVICES MARKET
The variety of data now available from several
different sources permits an informed assessment of
the extent of competition in the interexchange market. A review of the data, in light of the criteria
identified in Section II, above, leads to the conclusion
that the interexchange market is effectively competitive."' Neither AT&T nor any other competitor in
the interexchange market has sufficient market
power to control price in a manner adverse to the
public interest. Let us examine each of the criteria
identified above.
First, the available evidence unequivocally reveals
that AT&T's competitors have a high responsiveness
or elasticity of supply and that barriers to entry and
expansion in this market are very low. This conclusion should not be surprising. The FCC and state
regulatory bodies have liberally granted entry to
long-distance firms, effectively eliminating all regulatory barriers to entry. This liberalization of prior
entry restrictions is vividly demonstrated by the
number of firms that have entered this market. As
shown in Figure 1, over 450 competitors were providing long-distance service in the United States."
This flood of new entry, especially in the face of significant price decreases, clearly demonstrates that economic barriers to entry into this market are extremely low. Also, as seen in Figure 2, the total
minutes-of-use reported by the non-AT&T long-distance competitors for interstate services has grown at
an annual average rate of roughly twenty percent for
the 1984-1994 period.' Thus, as new firms have entered this market, they have been able to expand
their output (sales) rapidly. Another important factor in determining new firms' ability to expand out4' For similar conclusions see generally MICHAEL PORTER,
COMPETITION IN THE LONG DISTANCE MARKET (1993);
MICHAEL WARD,

MEASUREMENTS

OF MARKET

POWER IN

LONG DISTANCE TELECOMMUNICATIONS, FTC, BUREAU OF
ECONOMICS STAFF REPORT (1995); Michael L. Katz & Robert
D. Willig, The Case for Freeing AT&T, 7 REG. 43-49 (1983);

Robert E. Hall, Long Distance: Public Benefits from Increased
Competition, APPLIED ECON. PARTNERS (1993); see also David
L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Deregulation and Market
Power Criteria:An Evaluation of State Level Telecommunications Policy, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION: MAR65-102 (1990);
David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Long Distance Telecommunications Policy: Rationality on Hold, 122 PUB. UTIL.
FORT. 18 (1988); Kahai et al., supra note 27.
44 TELEPHONE TRENDS, supra note 5.
MARKET SHARES, supra note 7, Tbl. 2.
'a
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put (the elasticity of their supply) is the distribution
of transmission capacity in the interexchange market.
If existing firms' output were capacity-constrained,
their ability to defeat an attempted AT&T price increase could be limited. If competitors have abundant
capacity, however, both their ability and willingness
to lure away customers and expand output is heightened, especially if consumers demonstrate a willingness to utilize their services.
Data collected by the FCC and other studies indicate that the capacity available for the transmission
of long-distance traffic is abundant.' First, capacity
expansion in this market has been rapid and significant. As shown in Figure 3, AT&T's competitors
have aggressively built fiber-optic transmission capacity, and collectively they now own more activated
capacity than AT&T."7 It is also generally acknowledged that the large gap between activated fiber capacity and the potential capacity of the networks
now in place creates a huge reserve of additional capacity that could rapidly and inexpensively be
brought on-line should any firm in the market attempt to price anticompetitively. Moreover, the distribution of capacity across scores of interexchange
carriers and "carriers' carriers" assures that no single firm can limit competition through exercise of
"bottleneck" control of transmission capacity. Thus,
competing carriers' ability to rapidly expand output
in this market at low marginal cost is unconstrained
due to the widespread availability of abundant transmission capacity.
By definition, where new firms have demonstrated
their ability to enter a market and successfully capture market share over a protracted period of time,
economic barriers to entry and expansion are low
and, the responsiveness of their output to price is
high.' Many new firms have entered the interexchange market, built large amounts of capacity,
See, e.g., FIBER DEPLOYMENT UPDATE, supra note 6.
Id. Tbl. 2.
48 Recently, it has been alleged that the emergence of fiberoptic technology has created "huge" barriers to entry into the
long distance market. See, e.g., Jerry Hausman, The Long Dis46

47

tance Markets Today (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors). Such a conclusion is erroneous for at least two
reasons. First, the argument uses the wrong standard to judge
the height of barriers to entry. Entry barriers should be measured by examining the economic characteristics of the costs for
the most likely mode of entry. Thus, the fact that the construction and deployment of a nationwide fiber optic long-distance

network is costly and involves considerable sunk costs is irrelevant, because that is not the preferred least-cost mode of entry.

Profit maximizing firms will typically seek to enter markets via
a least-cost strategy that minimizes their exposure to losses if the
new venture fails. In the case of the long-distance industry, this
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provided a wide array of long-distance telecommunications services, and expanded their output rapidly.
This entry and expansion has benefited consumers
by enhancing customer choice, creating downward
pressure on prices, and providing heightened incentives for new service innovations. In addition, the
high supply elasticity demonstrated by this observed
behavior assures the long-run viability of competition
in this market.
Turning to the second set of market power determinants, virtually all of the fundamental demand
factors identified in Section II also unequivocally
point toward the presence of effective competition.
For example, demand growth has been quite strong
in the long-distance market. Interexchange switched
access minutes have grown nationally at an average
rate of about ten percent annually since 1984.' This
healthy growth rate has facilitated the emergence of
new competitors, as entrepreneurs seek to garner a
share of this burgeoning market."0 Indeed, this market growth has undoubtedly contributed to the observed entry of hundreds of new firms into the interexchange market. Moreover, the outlook for
continued growth in telecommunications markets appears excellent.
The distribution of demand also points toward the
likelihood of vigorous competitive rivalry among the
market participants. The demand for long-distance
calling is highly skewed. For AT&T, fifty-three percent of its residential customers account for ninetythree percent of long-distance revenues. 1 This
skewed demand distribution contributes to the vulnerability of interexchange companies' market
shares. Any attempt by one interexchange company
to raise prices above competitive levels would provide
significant financial incentives for its largest and
most profitable customers to switch carriers.
Consumers' willingness and ability to switch firms

also clearly shows that no interexchange firm can
manipulate the market price. Consumers' ability to
switch, of course, depends upon the ease with which
competing firms can reach customers seeking to utilize their services. The equal access conversion process, which is now virtually complete, has facilitated
this capability to provide customers a ready choice of
carriers. By the end of 1993, over ninety-seven percent of the nation's telephone lines had been converted to equal access."2 This conversion ensures that
consumers have a readily available choice of a variety of long-distance carriers. Indeed, a recent survey
of available choices for "1 +" long-distance carriers
found that residential customers typically have between ten and thirty long-distance carriers from
which to choose."3 Importantly, this competitive
choice is available to customers in urban, suburban,
and rural areas. As a result, substantial competitive
choice is now ubiquitous throughout the United
States. In today's environment, there is simply no
substantial portion of the population without a significant choice of long-distance carriers.
Not only do consumers typically have a number of
long-distance carriers from which to choose, but they
also have demonstrated in droves that they are willing to exercise that choice. Indeed, according to industry data, in 1994 residential customers switched
their long-distance carrier twenty-seven million
times.5 ' Taking "multiple switchers" into account,
this represents carrier changes by over nineteen million customers in 1994, or about one in five households. Based upon the most recent data available, it
appears that households will switch their long-distance company roughly thirty million times in
1995." 5 Moreover, it is important to note that it is
not just high volume customers who switch to alternative long distance carriers. Specifically, in 1994,
over ten million AT&T customers with average

least-cost path does not involve de novo construction of a fiber
optic transmission network but, rather, entry by leasing existing

WK., Feb. 20, 1995, at 92-97.

capacity. As new entrants grow and expand their customer bases, a point is reached where it may become economical to construct their own transmission networks, depending on the price
and availability of leased facilities. Second, regardless of any theoretical arguments regarding barriers to entry, the overwhelming
marketplace evidence regarding actual entry and expansion belie
the notion that any significant barriers to entry and expansion in
the interexchange industry exist. For a more complete discussion
see David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Long Distance Telecommunications: Expectations and Realizations in the Post-Divestiture Period, in INCENTIVE REGULATION FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES 83 (Michael A. Crew ed., 1994).
'9

MARKET SHARES,

supra note 7, Tbl. 1.

"0 See, e.g., Catherine Arnst et al., Phone Frenzy: Is There
Anyone Who Doesn't Want To Be a Telecom Player?, Bus.

51 See Ex PartePresentationin Support of AT&T's Motion
for Reclassification as a Nondominant Carrier,in CC Dkt. No.

79-252 (Mar. 9, 1995) [hereinafter Mar. 9 Ex Parte Presentation] (chart labeled, "over half of Light Users currently fall below break even").
82
TELEPHONE TRENDS, supra note 5, Tbl. 12.
5 See Kaserman & Mayo, supra note 48, at 92-93.
Ex Parte Presentation in Support of AT&T's Motion for

Reclassification as a Non-Dominant Carrier,in CC Dkt. No.
79-252 (Feb. 8, 1995) [hereinafter Feb. 8 Ex PartePresentation]
(chart labeled "Competition - Customers' Freedom of Choice").
See also Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 2, 1995)
(prepared statement of John W. Mayo at 3).
"' Ex Parte Presentation,supra note 1, Att. I (chart labeled
"The Long Distance Market").
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monthly usage of less than ten dollars per month
switched carriers.8 6 Consequently, all consumers
possess both the willingness and ability to switch between long-distance firms.
- Turning last to the market share data, capacitybased estimates reveal that AT&T's current market
share is roughly between forty and forty-five percent.5" AT&T's competitors-thus have more fiber optic capacity in place (measured by fiber-miles or
route-miles) than AT&T. As a consequence of prevailing capacity and demand conditions, it has been
estimated that AT&T's competitors could immediately absorb fifteen percent of AT&T's 1993 demand
without incurring any capital costs." Moreover, by
utilizing spare switch ports and existing transport facilities, it is estimated that AT&T's competitors
could absorb an additional seventeen percent of
AT&T's 1993 traffic within three months." Given
the rapidly evolving nature of the electronics of
switching and the commensurate increases in switching capacity, it is clear that the capacity of any given
carrier can be expanded very rapidly by deploying
newly available electronics. For example, relatively
straightforward alterations in the electronics may
boost several-fold the average number of DS-3's per
fiber pair embodied in today's electronics. 6° Thus,
for purposes of market power assessment, AT&T's
capacity-based market share measurement is actually
quite conservative. 1 AT&T's output-based 1994
market share is somewhat higher, about fifty-eight
percent of all interstate minutes-of-use." While
these alternative measures indicate that AT&T is a
major competitor in the interexchange services market, they are not out of line with the market shares
of other firms (e.g., Campbell Soup Company)
which operate in unregulated environments."
Moreover, AT&T's market share is not static.
The temporal pattern of its market share reveals that
AT&T's services are quite vulnerable to competitive
56

Id. at 34.

57

supra note 6.
See Ex Parte Presentation, supra note 1, at 2.
Id.
I9
Id. at 6.
These estimates, proffered by AT&T, are claimed to be

"
e0
11

FIBER DEPLOYMENT UPDATE,

conservative since they are based solely on MCI, Sprint, and
LDDS/Wiltel and ignore AT&T's other competitors in this
area. Id. at 2.
e'

e3

MARKET SHARES, supra note

7.

JOHN SUTTON, SUNK COST AND MARKET STRUCTURE:
PRICE COMPETITION, ADVERTISING, AND THE EVOLUTION OF
CONCENTRATION Tbl. M.8 (1991) (listing market shares in the
prepared soups industry).
" The vulnerability of AT&T to market share losses appar-
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attacks by rivals even in the absence of an attempted
price increase. At the time of divestiture, AT&T sold
the predominant share of interexchange services in
the United States. Figure 4 reveals that AT&T's
minutes-of-use market share has declined almost
continually throughout the post-divestiture period."
The fact that this decline has occurred over an eleven
year period in which AT&T's prices have fallen
dramatically (over fifty percent in real terms) 6
clearly indicates that AT&T will be highly vulnerable to even larger market share losses if it should
ever fail to offer quality services at competitive
prices.
Significantly, the aggregate trend of market share
declines masks an even more revealing vulnerability
of AT&T's customer base. As noted above, the longdistance marketplace is characterized by a considerable amount of customer churn. In 1994, some
twenty-seven million households switched long-distance carriers."' This widespread propensity of many
customers to switch carriers reveals the vulnerability
of every long-distance firm to rapid market share
erosion. AT&T's overall market share trend reveals
only the net effect of household switching. The true
vulnerability of AT&T to market share erosion is
considerably greater than the net market share trend
shown in Figure 4 suggests. On a monthly basis, residential customers are changing carriers over two
and a half million times. Given such demonstrated
willingness to change carriers, a single mis-step by
AT&T could result in significant and dramatic share
loss. This vulnerability to competitors is similar for
the business segment, where churn levels are somewhat lower but revenue per customer is much
higher. Such vulnerability clearly shows that the
marketplace effectively disciplines AT&T's pricing
behavior.67 The principal conclusion to be drawn
from the declining market share and substantial customer churn data is that, regardless of the historical
ently extends well beyond the losses to MCI and Sprint. Indeed,
recent data indicates that the most rapid growth in presubscribed
lines in recent periods has come from the so called "third tier"
carriers. KASERMAN & MAYO, supra note 20.

supra note 43, at 11.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
'7 AT&T's market share losses are not due to the ability of
regulators to effectively restrain some innate advantage that
AT&T might have were it freed from regulatory controls. Market share declines have occurred not only in states where AT&T
has been asymmetrically regulated (e.g., New York), but also in
states such as Virginia in which the regulatory commission has
eliminated asymmetric regulation. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
e
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"dominance" of AT&T in the market, no firm today
is immune to large market share swings if it were to
attempt to charge non-competitive prices. 68
In sum, the presence of numerous competitors, the
demonstrated vulnerability of AT&T's market share,
the widespread availability of transmission capacity,
the minimal amount of economic barriers to entry,
and the fundamentally pro-competitive demand conditions in the interexchange market clearly demonstrate the presence of effective competition. Moreover, several factors indicate that this competition
exists not just at, the aggregate level, but also for
every toll service and each geographic area within
the country. As pointed out in Section II, the degree
of competition is only meaningful when discussed
with respect to "the relevant market." In this case,
the relevant market includes all interexchange toll
services sold in the United States." Thus, the finding
of effective competition in the relevant market necessitates the conclusion that such competition exists for
each service and geographic area within that market.
Therefore, AT&T faces competitors in every geographic area within the United States and for every
70
toll service it offers.

tion stems from two additional sources that we
briefly review in this section. First, although it was
possible in the immediate wake of the divestiture to
argue (largely on conceptual grounds) that AT&T
had very little market power, we now have had over
ten years of actual marketplace experience on which
to base this conclusion. Numerous states have experimented with relaxed and, in many cases, symmetric
regulation of interexchange carriers. Second, the
FCC has substantially relaxed its regulation of interstate business services. Such experimentation provides a natural opportunity to observe AT&T's market behavior in a less stringent regulatory
environment and offers empirical evidence of
AT&T's lack of market power. In addition, the passage of time and the advancement of empirical industrial organization methodologies since the divestiture have now created the opportunity to formally
(econometrically) test the hypothesis that AT&T retains significant monopoly power. Specifically, it has
become possible, to estimate directly the degree of
market power held by AT&T. In the three subsections that follow, we briefly describe the results of
these two types of studies.

IV. COMPETITION IN THE INTEREXCHANGE MARKET: OTHER EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE

A.

The foregoing analysis provides clear evidence
that the interexchange market is subject to effective
competition. Corroborating evidence of such competi-

Relaxed Regulation: The State Evidence

Beginning with the Virginia State Corporation
Commission's decision in late 1984 to grant full pricing flexibility to all long-distance firms, including
AT&T, 1 the vast majority of states now have relaxed regulation of intrastate interLATA toll service

*" In this context, it is important to note that any explicit

*

public policy linkage between AT&T's market share and the removal of the "dominant" label and asymmetric regulation would
constitute very poor policy. Indeed, a policy that predicates an
end to asymmetric regulation on AT&T's market share falling
below some specific threshold reduces all firms' propensities to
compete. AT&T would, under such a policy, be encouraged to
refrain from aggressive competition in order to allow its market
share to fall below the threshold level. It could do this, for instance, by raising prices, refusing to offer new services, or allowing quality to fall. At the same time, the firms attempting to
prolong regulation of AT&T would face an incentive not to capture too much market share, so as to deny the "dominant" firm
regulatory freedoms to fully and freely compete for customers'
patronage. Thus, under a "market share threshold" policy, if
competitors succeed in attracting customers away from AT&T,
the "reward" is the deregulation of AT&T. In this scenario, the
entire competitive process is put in reverse. A contest is created
to see who can turn in the worst performance. This is the fundamental reason that the federal antitrust authorities have not established a singular focus on market share or created any market
share threshold test for the existence of significant monopoly
power.

70

See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
As noted above, over 97% of all local exchange access lines

in the United States have now been converted to equal access,
ensuring dialing and technical interconnection parity between
AT&T and its competitors in virtually every geographic location
in the United States. TELEPHONE TRENDS, supra note 5, Tbl.

12. Even the tiny fraction of customers without equal access are
protected from market power by the practice of geographically
uniform pricing. This practice assures that the price of a longdistance call is the same regardless of whether the origination
and termination locations are urban or rural, equal access or
nonequal access. Because competition is pervasive in equal access
areas with (typically) between 15 and 30 long distance carriers,
nonequal access areas are also assured competitive pricing.
Kaserman & Mayo, supra note 48, at 92-93. Moreover, even in
areas where equal access is not yet implemented, it is routine for
long-distance customers to be served by several interexchange
carriers. See, e.g., In re PSC's Investigation of the Regulatory
Status of Other Common Carriers and Contemplated Rulemaking, MONTANA

PUBLIC SERVICE COMM'N, Dkt. No. 94.2.8.

(Direct Testimony of John W. Mayo)(June 10, 1994).
7" See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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to varying degrees.1 As a result, it has become increasingly possible to examine empirically the cumulative evidence regarding the effects of such policies
and to make informed judgments about the likely
impacts of a further relaxation of regulatory controls. This type of evidence is extremely important in
public policy proceedings, because parties opposed to
relaxed regulation of AT&T have often argued that
such a policy would lead to various sorts of undesir7
For instance, some parties have
able consequencess.
predicted that AT&T would use its newfound pricing freedom to charge monopoly prices, including
differentiating between terms offered in contract tariffs for end users and those for resellers of telecommunications services to disadvantage its competitors.7 4 Others fear that relaxed regulation would
lead to predatory pricing, cross-subsidization, or reductions in universal service. 7 6 Given these predictions, it is informative to look at the experience with
reduced regulation of AT&T. If these feared consequences have not emerged under reduced regulation,
the predictions lose their credibility.
The available evidence strongly indicates that consumers have benefited substantially from reduced
regulation. Indeed, industry performance has improved markedly with the relaxation of regulatory
controls. It is of specific interest to regulatory commissions' current and ongoing deliberations that no
evidence exists that in those state jurisdictions where
policies of continued asymmetric regulation remain
that competitive performance in the interexchange
market has in any way improved. In fact, the availa"'

See supra note 15.

David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, The Ghosts of
Deregulated Telecommunications: An Essay by Exorcists, 6 J.
POL'Y. ANALYSIS MGMT. 84, 85 (1986); Kaserman & Mayo,
Long Distance Telecommunications Policy: Rationality on Hold,
78

supra note 43, at 21-25.
"

Comments of the Telecommunications Resellers Ass'n. to

the Ex Parte Presentation in Support of AT&T's Motion for
Reclassification as a Non-Dominant Carrier, at App. 1 (June 9,
1993).
75

MCI Telecommunications Corporation has argued that it

is premature to classify AT&T as non-dominant because it still
has substantial market share, dominates in market segments
seemingly "immune to the introduction of effective competition,"
and holds key patents for fundamental telecommunications systems. Comments of MCI Tel. Corp. to the Ex Parte Presentation in Support of AT&T's Motion for Reclassification as a
Non-Dominant Carrier passim (June 9, 1995). MCI suggested
that the FCC should at least reaffirm important "market rules"
to ensure that AT&T does not avoid its legal obligations. Id. at
7-21. Four of the Regional Bell Operating Companies have argued that the major long distance telephone companies have established a cooperative pricing pattern in which they generally
increase prices on one another's lead. Further Opposition of Bell

ble evidence strongly suggests that such regulation
has actually caused consumers to pay higher prices.
This conclusion is supported by several 'studies.
For example, one study of the effects of regulation
and competition on the prices of AT&T's intrastate
toll rates found that "[tlhe price of AT&T was
found to be lower in states with pricing flexibility
than in states where AT&T was operating under
rate of return regulation

. .

. [h]owever, the price of

AT&T service was lowest in states with complete
deregulation." 6 This study is congruent with an
earlier study by staff economists at the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") in which the authors
concluded, "(t)he results of this analysis suggest that
AT&T's daytime, evening, nighttime and weekend
rates are significantly lower in states that allow pricing flexibility than in states that use rate-of-return
regulation." 7 7 Indeed, the study indicates that the

price of a five-minute daytime intrastate toll call
was, on average, 7.2 percent lower in states that allow AT&T increased pricing flexibility.7
Together, these studies reject the hypothesis that
anticompetitive pricing has occurred under relaxed
regulatory policies and allay any fears of price escalation after regulation is relaxed. Indeed, the results
demonstrate that relaxed regulation is pro-competitive, and generally leads to significant price reductions. The results also provide compelling evidence
that AT&T lacks significant market power. If
should
AT&T had such power, relaxed regulation
79
have led to higher (not lower) prices.
Assessing whether any states have deemed it necAtlantic, BellSouth, Pacific Telesis, and SBC Communications
to the Motion for Reclassification of AT&T as a Nondominant
Carrier (June 9, 1995) [hereinafter RBOC Comments]. See also
William E. Taylor & J. Douglas Zona, Analysis of the State of
Competition in Long Distance Telephone Markets (1995), in
RBOC Comments, Att. E.
"' Robert Kaestner & Brenda Kahn, The Effects of Regula-

tion and Competition on the Price of AT&T Intrastate Telephone Service, 2 J. REG. ECON. 363, 372 (1990).
"

Alan D. Mathios & Robert P. Rogers, The Impact of Al-

ternative Forms of State Regulation of AT&T on Direct-Dial,
Long Distance Telephone Rates, 20 RAND. J. ECON. 437, 437

(1989).
78

Id. at 447.

79 One study reaches the conclusion that regulatory manipulation of access charges assessed to long-distance carriers, not
competition, has been responsible for price declines in the interexchange marketplace. See William Taylor & Lester D. Taylor,
PostdivestitureLong-Distance Competition in the United States,
83 AM. ECON. REV. 185, 189 (1993). This conclusion, as well as
the underlying data and methodology embodied in the study, are,
however, subject to serious debate. See, e.g., Letter from E. E.
Estey, Regulatory V.P., AT&T, to William F. Caton, Acting

Secretary, FCC (Mar. 21, 1995), in Ex Parte Preseniatin,
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essary to reverse reduced regulation policies in response to any performance problems presents another perspective on the experience with relaxed
regulation. Virtually all of the states that have implemented reduced regulation have retained their authority to reinstitute more stringent regulatory controls if the experience did not benefit consumers.
Moreover, these states have continued to monitor various aspects of market performance to detect
whether any undesirable consequences have materialized. An absence of reregulation clearly is indicative of competitive market performance.
Here again, the evidence is unequivocal. No state
that has relaxed regulation has found it necessary to
reverse itself. Indeed, in the state with the longest
experience with relaxed (and symmetric) regulation,
the Virginia State Corporation Commission staff
concluded that, "the information put forward here
reflects well, overall, on the effects of deregulation on
AT&T's prices in Virginia."'80 Similarly, in the state
of Washington, where AT&T has been granted substantial pricing flexibility with symmetric regulation,
an examination of interexchange rates led the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission to
conclude that "the competitive marketplace is
working.""8
B.

Relaxed Regulation: Business Services

The marketplace experience after the FCC's relaxation of regulation of AT&T's business services
in 1991 supplies additional evidence on the merits of
relaxed regulation.82 Competition for these services
has flourished in the wake of the removal of pricing
controls for AT&T. Moreover, while this competisupra note 1, Att. V (demonstrating that, when properly calculated, AT&T's rate reductions exceed access charge reductions
that have been resulting from regulation). Thus, while access
charge changes have, without doubt, contributed to the evolving
set of prices in the post-divestiture era, the assertion that revenue
reductions are eclipsed by access charge reductions is incorrect.
Moreover, the studies noted herein demonstrate that relaxed regulation of AT&T's toll services has had beneficial effects on
prices after accounting for access charge changes.
S0

VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, THE EFFECT OF DEREGULA-

TION ON AT&T PRICING IN VIRGINIA AND A COMPARISON OF
AT&T PRICING IN TEN STATES ACROSS THE UNITED STATES

14 (1987).

11

THE WASH. UTIL. AND TRANSP. COMM., THE STATUS
OF THE WASHINGTON TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 52

(submitted to the Washington State Legislature, Jan. 27, 1989).
"
The FCC allowed AT&T to offer contract-based rates
and terms of service to business customers. AT&T was required
to file these rates and conditions with the Commission and to

make them generally available to all similarly situated custom-

tion has been "messy" for individual competitors,
with hundreds of promotional offerings and
thousands of individual contract offerings, customers
have benefited immensely. Nominal prices have declined by roughly fifteen percent, scores of new services have been introduced, and quality has improved.88 This positive experience with . the
Commission's removal of pricing controls for business services provides additional evidence that asymmetric regulation of interexchange services is simply
unnecessary and is, in fact, harmful in today's
marketplace.
In summary, the published literature, internal
staff studies, and state and federal regulatory decisions to retain relaxed regulation policies all support
the conclusion that effective competition prevails in
the interexchange market. This body of empirical evidence does not support continued asymmetric regulation of AT&T by either federal or state regulators
under the "dominant" firm classification inherited
from the pre-divestiture period.
C. Direct Econometric Estimates of AT&T's Market Power
In recent years, the advancement of "new empirical industrial organization" techniques has provided
the means in certain situations to examine the market power of individual firms directly."" At least two
such studies of the interexchange industry have now
been performed. 5 Both employ a variant of the socalled residual demand estimation approach to generate empirical estimates of the "Lerner index" for
AT&T." This index provides a direct measure of
the degree of market power held by the firm. 87 Interers, and such filings required 14 day notice. In re Competition
in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Report & Order,6
FCC Rcd. 5880, 5901, recon. in part, 6 FCC Rcd. 7569 (1991),
further recon., 7 FCC Rcd. 2677 (1992). Two years later, in the
same docket, the Commission concluded that the 800 services
market was competitive enough to remove price cap regulation
on AT&T for these services. Second Report & Order, 8 FCC
Rcd. 3668 (1993).
83

Ex Parte Presentation, supra note 1, at 39-40.

a' For a survey of studies making use of these techniques see
Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of Industries with
Market Power, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORGANIZATION

1011, 1051-55 (R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig eds., 1989).
8 WARD, supra note 43; Kahai et al., supra note 27.
See A.P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the
Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 THE REV. OF ECON.
STUD. 157 (1933-1934). Lerner sets forth a formula to measure
monopoly power. Where "P" is price and "C" is marginal cost,
the "Lerner index" is given by (P - C) / P. Id. at 169.
87
WARD, supra note 43.
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estingly, these two studies make use of substantially
different methodologies and data sets, yet they reach
strikingly similar conclusions. Specifically, both studies find that AT&T holds little market power. In
fact, the Lerner index for AT&T is found to be well
below that of many firms operating in completely
unregulated industries.
The first study, by Michael Ward, staff economist
at the FTC, makes use of two data sets - a time
series for interstate calling that covers the period
from July 1986 to August 1991, and a pooled sample of monthly data that covers the 1988-1991 period
for five states.88 His study focuses on the small business and residential portion of the overall interexchange market.8" Simultaneous equations estimation techniques are employed to estimate both
demand and supply relationships.9 Ward's results
lend further support to the conclusion that AT&T
holds no economically significant market power in
the interexchange services market."'
The second study to attempt a direct measurement
of AT&T's market power is by Simran Kahai and
the authors of this paper. 2 This study makes use of
quarterly observations on interstate calling volumes
and tariffed rates for residential MTS service over
the period of third quarter 1984 to fourth quarter
1993. The theoretical framework for this study is
provided by the dominant firm/competitive fringe
model.9 Using this model, the study estimated simultaneously the total market demand and competitive fringe supply curves while controlling for exoge-

nous variables such as the price of carrier access and
the percent of lines converted to equal access.94 From
these estimates and known values for AT&T's market share (based on either capacity or minutes-ofuse), calculation of the price elasticity of AT&T's
residual'demand curve is feasible. The Lerner index
for AT&T, then, is given directly by the reciprocal
of this elasticity.
The estimated values for this index fall between
0.13 and 0.29, depending upon which market share
figure is used. 95 These values are then compared to
Lerner index estimates for other (predominantly unregulated) industries reported in two prior studies,
97
by Robert E. Hall"' and Timothy F. Bresnahan.
Both of these comparisons support the conclusion
that, relative to other firms in the United States
economy, AT&T possesses very little market power.
From these estimates and comparisons, the study
concludes that:

Id. at 24-25.
" Note that this is the Price Cap Basket 1 portion of the
market, in which the greatest concern has been expressed regarding the possibility of significant market power by AT&T.
Thus, Ward's results should hold a fortiori for the remainder of
the interexchange market.
90
WARD, supra note 43, at v.
9' From the results of this estimation, Ward writes that
[tlhis study measures empirically the competitiveness of
the long-distance telephone market. To do so, it estimates
firm-specific long-run demand elasticities for AT&T and
its rivals for long-distance service marketed to households
and small businesses during 1988-1991. A lower-bound
for AT&T's long-run demand elasticity is estimated to be
approximately -10.1. If AT&T's prices were completely
unregulated, this elasticity estimate implies that the upper-bound deadweight loss due to allowing AT&T to set
prices in excess of marginal cost would be about 0.36% of
total industry revenues in 1991, or $199 million in 1991.
While direct estimates of the costs imposed by the current
form of regulation are not available, this welfare loss estimate is well below previous estimates of the benefits that
followed partial deregulation of the long-distance market. . .The estimation results lead us to a number of conclusions. Chief among them is that the long-distance mar-

ket is relatively competitive. Because the long-distance
market appears more competitive now than during the period covered by our analysis, the current deadweight loss
from AT&T's exercise of market power may be even less
than our estimates.
Id. at iii-v.
92 See Kahai et al., supra note 27.
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Comparison of these values with prior Lerner index estimates for firms in other industries suggests that, relative
to these other (unregulated) industries, the long distance
market is highly competitive . . . [t]o the extent that the

'dominant firm' label and the affiliated policy of asymmetric regulation were originally proposed as a mechanism to
handle residual, but significant, monopoly power on the
part of AT&T, our findings clearly indicate that this is a
label and policy that are no longer warranted." a

Thus, both studies have estimated directly the degree
of market power held by AT&T and are in close
agreement. Both demonstrate the positive impact of

9

For a discussion of this model, see KASERMAN & MAYO,

supra note 20, at 104-09. Despite the rather pejorative title of
this model, its use implies no a prioripresumption of significant
market power on the part of the so-called "dominant firm." See
generally Landes & Posner, supra note 21. For a more complete
discussion of the term "dominant" in the economics and telecommunications regulation literatures see Kahai et al., supra note
27.
9" Kahai et al., supra note 27, at 11-15.
"
Id. at 20. These estimates are probably biased upward
due to the use of a short-run estimate of total market demand
elasticity. They imply a price elasticity of demand for AT&T's
services of between -3.45 and -7.69. Id.
"' Robert E. Hall, The Relation Between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry, 96 J. oF POL. EcoN. 921 (1988).
9 Bresnahan, supra note 84, at 1051.
9 Kahai et al., supra note 27, at 28-29.
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reduced regulation on market performance, and fortify the more traditional structure-conduct-performance studies of underlying industry characteristics.
The cumulative weight of this evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the interexchange
market is subject to effective competition.
V.

OTHER COMPETITIVE/POLICY ISSUES

The preceding assessment of the evidence from a
variety of sources clearly demonstrates that AT&T
does not possess the power to control price unilaterally in the interexchange market. That is, AT&T
does not have significant market power. Consequently, under both the economic and regulatory
definitions of dominance, AT&T is not a dominant
firm.
Nonetheless, the authors have encountered some
parties who have been willing to accept (or, at least,
not oppose) this basic conclusion, but have been reluctant to advocate adoption of a symmetric regulatory policy. This reluctance is due to other concerns
about market conduct and performance that might
arise under such a policy. Specifically, three principal issues have been raised: the three largest firms
could engage in tacit collusion and supra-competitive
pricing;99 AT&T could engage in predatory pricing,
causing substantial exit and a reconcentration of the
market; and AT&T may raise prices to its low volume or rural customers, where it is believed to hold
a much larger market share."' 0 In this section, we
briefly address each of these competitive issues.
Before turning to these issues, however, two points
are worth noting. First, the competitive concerns
listed above are not new. Each of these issues has
been raised and successfully resolved in various
state-level regulatory proceedings. Despite allegations based on these concerns, numerous state commissions have chosen to implement relaxed/symmetric regulatory

policies.101

To date, no evidence

whatsoever has appeared that would indicate that
anticompetitive consequences have emerged.
Second, when confronted with allegations that
" See RBOC Comments, supra note 75. See also Paul W.
MacAvoy, Tacit Collusion Under Regulation in the Pricing of
Interstate Long-Distance Telephone Services, 4 J. OF ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY

147 (1995).

This list of competitive issues is not exhaustive. It does,
however, cover the major concerns that have been raised. This
article's analytic analysis in responding to these concerns and the
conclusions reached herein should easily be transferable to related issues.
101 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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these (or other) performance problems are likely to
materialize in a less stringently regulated environment, questions must be asked: What, precisely, is
the alleged concern? Is the market in question conducive to the sort of behavior postulated, and is there
evidence that such behavior has arisen? Does the existing policy of asymmetric regulation make sense as
a policy instrument to prevent the alleged conduct?
Finally, is there an alternative, less stringent policy
that is likely to be more successful in addressing the
problem? Of course, the third and fourth questions
are relevant only if the answer to the second is
"yes." This sort of structured approach will help to
ensure that public policy is responsive to the realities
(and not the myths) of the marketplace. We now apply this approach to the issues listed above.
A.

The Tacit Collusion Issue

From the time of divestiture, various parties have
argued that long-distance telecommunications firms
might engage (or are engaging) in tacit collusion to
keep prices above competitive levels. The concept of
tacit collusion was first developed by Edward H.
Chamberlin in 1933.10° The basic idea is that under
certain conditions, rival firms in a highly concentrated industry may gravitate toward the joint-profit
maximizing (i.e., monopoly) price and output without actually entering into an explicit overt agreement
to fix prices.1 0 Whether this sort of behavior is
likely to occur, however, is highly dependent upon
the specific characteristics of the market in question.
For tacit collusion to arise, industry conditions must
be favorable to the stable sort of "meeting of the
minds" that must occur to sustain this type of highly
coordinated market conduct.1 0'
The market structure exhibited by the long-distance telecommunications industry is not conducive
to such tacit collusion. At least seven structural attributes of this industry effectively preclude such behavior. First, collusion of any sort (either tacit or
overt) cannot succeed in the absence of significant
barriers to entry and expansion. The reason for this
101
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A

REORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF

(8th ed. 1962).
Id. at 106.

Conspiracy within an industry may exist only where the
behavior indicates "a unity of purpose or a common design and
understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful arrangement." Nurse Midwifery Assoc. v. Hibbet, 918 F.2d 605,
616 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991).
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is straightforward. To the extent that colluding firms
succeed in raising market prices above competitive
levels, new firms will enter the industry and/or existing non-colluding firms will expand output unless
entry and expansion barriers prevent such natural
market responses. Such entry and output expansion
increase supply and drive prices back down, thereby
defeating any collusive attempts to increase prices.
Therefore, tacit collusion cannot succeed (and, consequently, will not arise) in markets characterized by
relatively easy entry. Indeed, the fundamental role
that entry barriers play in allowing collusion or
other anticompetitive forms of conduct to arise has
led F.M Scherer and David Ross to write that, "significant entry barriers are the sine qua non of monopoly and oligopoly . . . .
Additionally, Roger
Sherman points out that "[tjo perpetuate a cooperative solution, the firms must be able to limit industrial capacity to supply the good. Existing firms must
resist expansion and there must be barriers to the
entry of new firms."' 0 6
No substantial barriers to entry into the long-distance telecommunications industry exist. The observed entry of over 450 new firms during the past
decade in the face of declining prices provides compelling evidence that entry into this market is readily
achievable. Moreover, the market is free of major
barriers to expansion that would prevent smaller
firms already in the market from increasing their
supply if the larger firms were to attempt to increase
prices above competitive levels. Both MCI and
Sprint entered this market at smaller scales than
many current market participants now enjoy. The
substantial market share gains these two firms have
realized could be replicated by the smaller carriers if
the top three firms were to increase prices to supracompetitive levels. Indeed, the combined market
share of these smaller firms has more than doubled
in recent years and now exceeds the market share of
108
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supra note 5, at 45 (Tbl. 30).
See Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, Collusive
Pricing with Capacity Constraints in the Presence of Demand
Uncertainty, 23 RAND. J. ECON. 203 (1992), where in referring
to SCHERER & Ross, supra note 105, it notes a "large body of
empirical evidence" supports the proposition that the incentive
for vigorous price competition is most likely when capacity utilization is low. Id. at 203. The authors provide additional theoretical support for this proposition, concluding that price undercutting and market share instability can emerge if excess capacity is
sufficiently great. Id. at 216.
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Sprint."'0 With no substantial barriers to expansion,
these firms provide an effective constraint against
tacit collusion by AT&T and its larger rivals.
Therefore, the absence of significant entry and expansion barriers provides an effective safeguard
against tacit collusion in this market.
The second structural characteristic of the interexchange market that prevents the emergence of tacit
collusion is the substantial amount of spare capacity
that exists in this industry. The economic literature
on collusive behavior widely recognizes the tendency
for collusive arrangements to break down in the
presence of excess capacity.' 08 The logic of the argument is straightforward. Where excess capacity is
present, the marginal cost of increasing the individual firm's output can be quite low. As a result, the
difference between a collusive price and marginal
cost becomes great, and the incentive to increase output (or "cheat" on the collusive agreement) is correspondingly great. As participating firms succumb to
this incentive to cheat, the collusive agreement collapses and the market price falls towards the competitive level.' 0 This has led Stephen Martin to conclude that "[f]or this reason, economists have argued
that substantial excess capacity increases the likelihood of price wars and a breakdown in oligopolistic
control of prices."'' 0 Excess capacity is thus an
anathema to successful collusion. Its presence in the
long-distance market makes tacit collusion extremely
unlikely."'
The third structural characteristic that frustrates
any effort to achieve and maintain tacit collusion in
this industry is the marked differences that exist in
the market shares of the three largest firms. These
unequal shares tend to confound the sort of mutually
cooperative behavior that must be achieved without
explicit communication if tacit collusion is to succeed." Unless MCI and Sprint are content to continue to hold the market shares they now possess
'" While the traditional argument about the role of excess
capacity in frustrating collusive agreements has been cast in
terms of breaking down an existing agreement, the logic of this
argument applies equally to the inability to form such an agreement in the presence of excess capacity.
110
STEPHEN MARTIN, INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS: EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 149-50 (1988).
"1 This point has explicitly been recognized by various regulatory bodies including the FCC. See, e.g., AT&T Price Cap
Order, supra note 27, para. 25.
111 For an example of research demonstrating the confounding effects of marketplace asymmetries on supra-competitive pricing see Charles F. Mason, Owen R. Phillips & Clifford
Novell, Duopoly Behavior in Asymmetric Markets: An Experimental Evaluation, 74 REV. OF ECON. AND STAT. 662, 670
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(which, historically, they clearly have not been content to do), their efforts to expand their shares will
doom to failure any tacitly collusive agreement. The
inherent tension created by substantially different
market shares also serves to reduce the likelihood of
tacit collusion.
The fourth characteristic of the long-distance market that is fundamentally incompatible with tacit collusion is the relatively complex structure of prices
and the predominant mechanism through which effective price changes are now instituted. The sort of
coordination-without-communication required for
tacit collusion to succeed is generally thought to require a high degree of product homogeneity with a
very simple price structure, i.e., a single, widely
known, price that is the same for each unit of output
sold."' Without such pricing simplicity, it becomes
exceedingly difficult for the parties to the (unstated)
agreement to know what price they are supposed to
charge. It also becomes much more tempting to cheat
on the agreement by lowering price, because such
behavior is more difficult to detect with a complex
pricing structure.
In the interexchange telecommunications market,
however, pricing is anything but simple. The price
for a minute of long-distance service from a given
supplier is likely to vary with distance, duration,
time of day, day of the week, and which (if any) discount program is selected. Moreover, some carriers
compete by eliminating the distance sensitivity of
long-distance calling, while other carriers compete by
altering the time increments over which a call will
be measured. Additionally, numerous and frequent
price changes are initiated in this market by the various carriers through a plethora of discount programs and affinity marketing plans. For example,
joint marketing efforts between long-distance carriers

and airlines offer frequent flier miles in exchange for
using the long-distance carriers' service."1 Other
similar joint marketing programs between major
U.S. companies and interexchange carriers are becoming increasingly popular.1 5 The presence of
these "in kind" discounts make the pricing - both
identification and agreement - necessary for successful tacit collusion among the various interexchange carriers highly unlikely.
In recent years the use of short-run promotions
also has grown as a competitive instrument in this
market. For instance, in each of the past two years,
AT&T has introduced over 400 promotional offerings. 1 Finally, the use of individual contracts between customers and long-distance carriers has increased in recent years. Since 1993, AT&T alone
has filed some 2,000 contract tariffs for individual
customers.117 As a result, it is extremely difficult for
a competitor to know the effective price being
charged and very easy for any given competitor to
"cheat" on any pricing that is perceived to be above
competitive levels. In this incontrovertibly complex
and dynamic pricing environment, it strains credibility to contend that competitors could formulate and
sustain a tacitly collusive agreement to charge supracompetitive prices.
The fifth characteristic of the interexchange telecommunications market that is unfavorable to tacit
collusion is the dynamic nature of the technology in
this industry. 8 Where new products and/or production techniques are a common occurrence, collusive arrangements tend to be particularly difficult to
sustain, because such changes provide expanded opportunities and incentives to increase profits by
cheating on the agreement.1 1 While a price cut, if
detected, may be retaliated against quickly by rival
producers, thereby rapidly eroding the potential

(1992) ("Our results indicate that asymmetry is a powerful control on cooperative behavior in highly concentrated markets ...

ers 30 minutes of free MCI long-distance calls every month for a
year. Id. These types of programs, driven exclusively by the
rivalrous competition between the various long-distance carriers,

CARLTON ET AL., MODERN INDUS. ORGAN-

undeniably benefit long-distance consumers even though the ben-
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IZATION (2d ed. 1994) "Firms have more difficulty agreeing on
relative prices when each firm's product has different qualities
or properties." Id at..
114 MCI pioneered this type of program in 1988 and now
has arrangements with at least four major airlines, American
Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Continental Airlines, and South-

west Airlines, that also include cellular and paging service.
Pager Messages Turn Into Frequent Flyer Miles with MCI,
PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 14, 1995, Financial Section. AT&T has

similar marketing programs and offers three USAir discount certificates to some of its Universal Mastercard credit and phone
cardholders. Lisa Fickenscher, Marketing: AT&T and American Express Pile Extras on College Cards, AMERICAN BANKER,

Sept. 5, 1995, at 24. American Express has offered its cardhold-

efits may not appear in an examination of tariffed rates.
.. One example is AT&T offering customers the opportunity to accumulate points toward a trip to Walt Disney World.
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Calling Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1995, at 48.
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Ex Parte Presentation, supra note 1, at 39-40.

11

Id. at 40.

"Industries that are subject to rapid technological change
find it particularly difficult to reach agreements." Alexis Jacquemin et al., Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal Merger, in 1
HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORGANIZATION 415, 420 (Richard
Schmalensee et al., eds., 1989).
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gains from cheating, a new product cannot be so easily replicated. Consequently, the incentive to cheat
through product innovations can exceed the incentive
to cheat by simply reducing prices on a standardized
product. The outcome, however, is the same. As all
firms face the same incentives, cheating spreads and
the collusive arrangement breaks down. Therefore,
industries characterized by rapid product innovation,
such as the long-distance market, are generally considered to be unlikely candidates for tacit
collusion. 2 0
A sixth aspect of the interexchange marketplace
that undermines the potential for supra-competitive
pricing from tacit collusion stems from its market demand characteristics. The well-known skewness in
the demand for long distance services - wherein a
relatively small share of interexchange customers account for a considerably larger share of the long distance business generated - creates a tremendous incentive for individual carriers to price aggressively.
Given the demonstrated willingness of customers to
switch their long distance carrier, this skewness of
demand creates huge opportunities for large market
share gains through aggressive pricing in the event
that any other carrier or set of carriers is not similarly pricing aggressively. At the same time, this
skewness, taken together with the willingness to
switch long distance carriers, makes virtually every
firm in the interexchange marketplace vulnerable to
large market share losses if its prices were to rise to
supra-competitive levels as a result of tacit collusion.
Additionally, the overwhelming propensity of longdistance consumers to switch their long-distance pro-

vider also undermines the prospect for tacit collusion.

There has been a proliferation, if not explosion, of new

license for other non-participating firms to expand sales and
profits. In particular, where the elasticity of supply of these
other market participants is high (i.e., barriers to entry and expansion are low), as it unequivocally is in this industry, any
"meeting of the minds" among a subset of the over 450 participants will be defeated by standard market forces.
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service offerings to long-distance consumers in the post-divesti-

ture period. A partial accounting for California alone found that
a minimum of 130 new long-distance services had been made
available to interexchange consumers in that state between 1984
and 1994. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, Ex. JWM-16 (Rebuttal
Testimony of John W. Mayo) (transcript on file with author).
See also Peter Pitsch, A Brief History of Competition in the
Long Distance Communications Market, at Tbl. 2, in Ex Parte

Presentation in Support of AT&T's Motion for Reclassification
as a Nondominant Carrier(Sept. 22, 1994).
121
MARTIN, supra note 110, at 147.

A related structural characteristic, market concentration,
is sometimes thought to facilitate tacit collusion. While market
122

concentration may, ceteris paribus, facilitate tacit collusion, this

factor is benign in the case of the long-distance industry. As
noted in the body of this paper, numerous other structural characteristics undermine the ability of this market to successfully

maintain supra-competitive tacitly collusive prices, regardless of
the extent of concentration. Nothing about market concentration,

per se, mitigates any of the other impediments to successful tacit
collusion. Moreover, any partial tacit collusive scheme that involves only the "concentrated" firms in this market becomes a

"It follows that collusion is more likely to be successful if customers do not switch suppliers very

often." 2 '
A seventh structural characteristic of the interexchange marketplace that erodes the potential for
supra-competitive pricing from tacit collusion is the
large number of firms that provide long-distance
telephone service in the United States."" It is well
established in the theoretical and empirical literature
that as the number of competitors in a market grows
the ability of the market to sustain supra-competitive
pricing falls. In particular, as the number of competitors expands, the ability of the various competitors
to have a "meeting of the minds" becomes geometrically more difficult.' 8 The sheer volume of competitors and their virtual ubiquity provide a huge structural impediment to the prospect for tacitly collusive
supra-competitive pricing.
In addition to these structural characteristics, the
behavioral evidence against tacit collusion is equally
compelling. At least four aspects of observed conduct
and performance are clearly inconsistent with the
claim that tacit collusion is occurring in this market.
First, the downward trend in industry prices over
the past eleven years is clearly inconsistent with successful collusion. Real transaction prices net of access
charges have fallen consistently since divestiture.
Moreover, the prices from which this downward
trend started had been set by regulators at "just and
reasonable" levels. It is hard to envision how one can
reconcile this trend with tacit collusion.""
Second, AT&T's market share has exhibited
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MICROECONoMics 565 (1991) ("The more firms in a market,
the less likely is cooperation, ceteris paribus.").
'""
Paul W. MacAvoy has asserted that prices have recently
risen and argued that this, along with allegedly stable market
shares, indicates that tacit collusion exists in this industry. See
Aff. of Paul W. MacAvoy at 52-53, United States v. Western
Elec. Co., Inc. & AT&T (D.C. Cir. 1956) (Civ. No. 82-0192),
in RBOC Comments, supra note 75, Att. A; MacAvoy, supra
note 99. This proposition has been rebutted with the argument
that MacAvoy's perceived price increases are illusory (stemming
from examination of AT&T's basic schedule tariffed rates rather
than the transaction prices consumers actually pay), and that the
alleged market share stability has turned out to be extremely
short-lived. Id. at 9,18 (Affs. of R. Glenn Hubbard and William
H. Lehr).
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marked instability throughout the post-divestiture
period. AT&T's market share reveals the net effect
of substantial underlying customer churn among the
competitors in this market. Unstable market share is
generally considered to be prima facie evidence of an
absence of successful collusion. Even opponents of
relaxed symmetric regulation in the interexchange
market acknowledge this point (albeit in different forums). For example, Jerry Hausman has stated that
"[c]hanging market shares are a sign of strong competition."1" 5 Richard Schmalensee has also acknowledged this point, writing that "[w]hile stable market
shares and firm ranks are consistent in principle
with either collusion or competition, most would argue that unstable shares and ranks are inconsistent
with effective collusion." ' Observed market share
changes in the long-distance industry therefore are
also inconsistent with tacit collusion.
Third, the advertising and aggressive marketing
campaigns of the three largest firms are inconsistent
with tacit collusion. These campaigns reveal an intense rivalry and focus on price information that
would not likely exist under tacit collusion. For example, a large proportion of competitors' commercials are directly aimed at taking customers from rivals by informing them of their new discount
programs. These programs account for much of the
observed price reductions implemented in recent
years. This advertising represents a drain on joint
profits and, therefore is inconsistent with the maintenance of a tacit cooperative agreement among these
firms. In sum, the overtly aggressive solicitation efforts that are readily observable at the most casual
level belie the contention that the interexchange market is characterized by tacit collusion.
Fourth, if the hypothesis that tacit collusion has
arisen in the interexchange market in recent years
was correct, a distinct change in the supply behavior
of the smaller firms in the industry should be observed at the time such an agreement arose. As can
be seen in Figure 2, however, no such change is apparent in the data on AT&T's competitors' output at
any point in time. As discussed above, applying a
more rigorous, explicit econometric test by modeling

the market demand and competitive fringe supply
curves simultaneously while controlling for various
exogenous factors yields no evidence whatsoever to
support a finding of tacit collusion. 27 Industry structure, observed behavior, and formal econometric testing thus all confirm the -conclusion that tacit collusion will not arise and has not arisen in this
market."12
Moreover, contrary to assertions advanced by
MacAvoy, 9 recent rate restructuring in the longdistance market - basic schedule increases more
than offset by price cuts in discount offerings - appears to reflect competitive pressures to move prices
to cost. "AT&T's basic schedule rates do not recover
the direct costs of serving the one third of customers"
that call less than $3 per month. 0 These costs include monthly subsidy costs for universal service "of
$.52 per customer and bill-rendering costs ranging
from $.33 to $.88 per customer." ' 1 Thus, in contrast
to the fanciful tale of tacit collusion, a far more
straightforward market-based explanation exists for
the upward movement of certain MTS rates by the
various interexchange carriers. Specifically, AT&T
has an incentive to raise basic rates toward competitive levels to begin to cover the marginal costs of
serving these low volume customers. By the same token, MCI and Sprint and the other long-distance
carriers have an equally strong incentive to match
these increases to avoid attracting the unprofitable
part of the market. Competition drives market prices
to costs, and that may mean either an increase or a
decrease in these rates.
The pricing actions taken by AT&T, MCI, and
Sprint in the rest of the residential market are more
relevant to this debate. The potential gains from collusive pricing would have been the greatest in this
higher volume, more profitable segment of the market.1" 2 Instead of maintaining rates, however, the
major carriers have frequently cut prices and introduced widely-touted new offers over the last five
years to attract customers in this segment. Therefore,
recent pricing actions in the long-distance market are
better characterized as a movement to cost-based
prices and enhanced competition, not as an outcome

113 See Aff. of Jerry Hausman at 14, W. Elec. Co., in
RBOC Comments, supra note 75, Att. C.
"e
Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure
and Performance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORGANIZATION
951, 999 (Richard Schmalensee et al., eds., 1989).

note 77, at 438-39; Kaestner & Kahn, supra note 76, at 364. If
such collusion had materialized in a more relaxed regulatory environment, prices should have been increased, not decreased.
129
See supra note 124.

137

Kahai et al., supra note 27, at 29.

Earlier studies discussed in this article also confirm that
reduced and symmetric regulation of AT&T has not resulted in
successful tacit collusion. See, e.g., Mathios & Rogers, supra

130

Ex Parte Presentation,supra note 1, at 51 n.119.

Id.; see also AT&T's Reply Comments in CC Dkt. No.
79-252, Att. B., at 20-21 (Sept. 18, 1990) (statement of Stanley
131

M. Bensen).
13e
See Pitsch, supra note 120, at 38.
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Another concern that has been raised is the possibility of predatory pricing by AT&T. This problem
vanishes as soon as one recognizes how predatory
pricing must operate and the industry characteristics
that must be in place for the strategy to succeed.' 84
Predatory pricing involves a two-step process. First,
a firm reduces its prices below costs in order to drive
rival producers out of the market. Then, following
such exit, the successful predator raises its prices
well above the competitive level in order to recoup
the losses incurred during the period of predation.
For predatory pricing to occur, existing rivals must
have relatively low sunk costs so that their exit can
be encouraged at reasonable expense. Also, for the
predator to recoup losses through future profits, substantial barriers to entry must exist to protect it from

post-predation competition. Clearly, neither of these
two conditions exist in the interexchange market.
Predatory pricing therefore is extremely unlikely to
occur in this industry.
To understand how exaggerated the concern over
predatory pricing in the interexchange market is, one
need only consider the events that would have to occur under the scenario envisioned. First, AT&T
would have to run more than 450 other firms out of
business by charging unjustifiably low rates while
the FCC, state regulatory commissions, and antitrust
authorities stood by without intervening. Moreover,
all of the transmission and switching capacity owned
by these other firms (much of which represents sunk
costs) would have to be purchased by AT&T in order to keep it out of the hands of new competitors.
Then, AT&T would have to raise its rates above the
competitive level to regain its losses without attracting market entry (or reentry). Once again, this
would have to occur while regulatory commissions
and antitrust authorities stand idly by. Obviously,
this sequence of events is extremely improbable.
The argument that a less-stringent regulatory environment would lead to predatory pricing is also rebutted by observing state level developments. If relaxed regulation leads to predation, then those states
that have implemented such a policy should have realized a reduction in the number of interexchange
carriers as AT&T lowered its rates to predatory
levels.'" 5 A recent empirical analysis of the impact of
relaxed regulation on the number of long-distance
firms competing within each state, however, reveals
Reduced and/or symmetric
no significant effect.'
regulation of this firm has not resulted in significant
exit by rival producers. Consequently, it has not led
to predation and relaxed and symmetric regulation
will not lead to predation in the future under any
industry
of evolving
plausible examination
conditions.13 7

See, e.g., SCHERER & Ross, supra note 105, at 266

Court observed that "there is a consensus among commentators

("Government agencies may inadvertently facilitate price paral-

that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more

lelism by setting ceiling prices, e.g., as part of anti-inflation
campaigns.").
' For a more complete discussion of both the theory and
empirical evidence relating to predatory pricing in general see
KASERMAN & MAYO, supra note 20, at 128-42.
Under current antitrust standards, a claim of predatory
18
pricing must pass what has come to be known as an incentive
logic filter if it is to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
Where a prolonged period of alleged predation has not resulted
in substantial exit, the allegation fails to pass this filter, because
the alleged behavior simply does not make sense economically

rarely successful."). A summary of the economics of this case is
presented in Kenneth G. Elzinga, Collusive Predation: Matsushita v. Zenith, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION (John E.
Kwoka and Lawrence J. White eds., 1989).
186
Simran K. Kahai, David L. Kaserman & John W.
Mayo, Deregulation and Predation in Long Distance Telecommunications: An Empirical Test, ANTITRUST BULL, Fall 1995,

of tacit collusion.
Finally, one must question the relevance of the
tacit collusion argument to the issue of whether to
reclassify AT&T as a non-dominant carrier and to
further eliminate any remaining asymmetric regulatory controls. It is generally conceded that regulation
of prices in a market tends to make collusion more
likely, not less likely.' 8 Pre-announcement of price
changes, notification requirements, intervention opportunities, and open discussions of market conditions in regulatory forums all discourage aggressive
price competition and facilitate the sort of information exchanges that tend to promote collusive outcomes. As a result, even if one believes that the interexchange market is conducive to tacit collusion
(which it is not), the appropriate policy action would
still be to eliminate direct price regulation of AT&T
by reclassifying it as nondominant. In so doing, more
aggressive competition would be fostered, and the
likelihood of tacit collusion would be reduced.
Predatory Pricing

B.

188

under these circumstances. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986) (The Supreme

pp. 645-66.
187 The authors of this study concluded:
In this paper, we have attempted to buttress the theoretical argument against the predatory pricing hypothesis
with empirical evidence. Our findings yield no support for
the argument that reduced regulation has resulted in pre-
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Low Volume/Rural Customers

A common concern among regulators considering
reduced regulation for AT&T has been that, with
increased pricing flexibility, AT&T may be able to
raise its rates to certain customer groups above competitive levels without experiencing a sufficient decline in sales to render such rate increases unprofitable."' 9
In other words, while the overall
interexchange market may be subject to effective
competition, pockets of customer groups could remain susceptible to abuse. If so, relaxed regulation
might lead to lower rates for some groups and higher
(than competitive) rates for others. In particular, low
volume residential customers and rural customers
have been perceived to be at risk. These concerns,
however, are unfounded.
First, the fundamental premise of the argument is
inaccurate. In order for specific customer groups to
be subject to abuse, they must first be confronted
with monopoly or near-monopoly supply. That is,
these groups must have a limited number of longdistance firms from which to choose, or they must be
unwilling to switch suppliers in response to a significant price increase. Neither of these conditions exists
in the long-distance market. The empirical evidence
pertaining to the interexchange market reveals that
substantial competitive choices are available to all
customer groups, regardless of their geographic location or volume of usage;" 9 and a disaggregated
breakdown of industry churn numbers reveals that
low volume users do, in fact, frequently switch carriers, and these users are spread across all demographic groups.1 40 The assertions that low volume or
rural customers face a limited choice of carriers, that
they will not change carriers, or that they fit some
specific demographic group, are simply myths. These
customers do have choices, they do exercise those
choices, and they span all demographic groups.
Therefore, they do not need special regulatory

dation. In conjunction with the prior empirical literature
relating to this market, the evidence strongly suggests that:
(1) long-distance prices have fallen with divestiture and
increased competition; (2) these prices have fallen more
where regulatory constraints on AT&T have been re-

laxed; and (3) the price reductions observed have had no
predatory effects.

Id. at 20.
'" Regulators should not be concerned about AT&T raising
its rates to competitive levels under a more relaxed regulatory
environment. Moving prices toward marginal cost is generally

welfare-improving regardless of whether that movement is upward or downward from the existing level.
"" Moreover, note that the demographic characteristics of

protection.
Second, from an economic perspective, concerns
about adverse pricing to specific customer groups ultimately involve concerns about price discrimination.
Price discrimination occurs where different prices
are charged to different groups of customers, with
the price differences not based upon differences in
the costs of serving those groups. For price discrimination to occur, two necessary conditions must exist.
The firm practicing price discrimination must hold
some degree of market power and arbitrage across
customer groups must be prevented."" In the longdistance market, neither condition is met. All customer groups have a choice of carrier in a market
with effective competition and are, therefore, not susceptible to discriminatory prices. Also, arbitrage opportunities exist through the ability to resell. As a
result, any attempt to raise the rates for low volume
or rural customers, by an amount that is not justified
by underlying differences in the costs of serving such
customers, will be defeated by the supply response of
competitors and/or arbitrage by resellers. Market
conditions will not tolerate the sort of behavior that
would subject these groups to abuse.
Third, all of the empirical studies surveyed in this
article 42 have used the basic schedule tariff rates as
their price variables in the empirical analyses. The
schedule tariff rates are the maximum rates that low
volume and residential customers pay when they
place a long-distance call. 48 Customers enrolled in a
discount program pay a lower rate. As a result, the
findings, that reduced regulation leads to significant
price reductions and that AT&T does not hold significant market power, are not limited to large volume or urban customers. Such conclusions apply to
all customers, including those paying the full tariffed
(non-discounted) rates.
Finally, identical concerns about low volume or
rural customer groups have been voiced previously at
the state level as well. Despite such concerns, howlow-volume long-distance customers is very similar to the demographic profile of other long-distance consumers. Thus, there is
no sound basis for using volume-sensitive regulation to attempt
to promote income redistribution goals. See Ex Parte Presentation, supra note 1, Att. 0.
140
See Mar. 9 Ex Parte Presentation,supra note 51 (charts
indicating that the consumer profile of light users is comparable
to heavy users).
141
See Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORGANIZATION 597, 599 (R. Schmalensee et
al., eds., 1989).

"s Mathios & Rogers, supra note 77; Kaestner & Kahn,
supra note 76; Ward, supra note 43; Kahai et al., supra note 27.
141
47 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
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ever, many states have implemented reduced/symmetric regulatory policies, and the feared abuse of
these customer groups has not occurred. Compelling
evidence that such groups are not at risk is provided
by the fact that state regulatory agencies have continued to monitor performance and have not reinstituted prior regulatory controls. In fact, the empirical
evidence strongly suggests that low volume and rural
customers stand to gain from reduced regulation. As
a result, the combined evidence shows that continued
asymmetric regulation of AT&T, which is ostensibly
intended to protect these customer groups, actually
has the effect of harming them.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have drawn together and assessed a wide array of evidence relevant to asymmetric regulation of AT&T and its classification under
existing FCC and state regulatory commission rules.
This evidence comes from a decade of experience
during which market conditions have evolved rapidly, many states have implemented a variety of relaxed (and symmetric) regulatory policies, and the
FCC has applied reduced regulation to AT&T's
business services. Such evidence consists of descriptive data pertaining to the underlying economic determinants of market power; empirical studies of the
effects of relaxed regulation at the state level on the
prices charged in the interexchange market; experience in the provision of AT&T's interstate business
services under streamlined regulation; and empirical
studies that directly estimate the degree of market
power held by AT&T.
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Given both the economic and regulatory definitions of dominance, the principal criterion for regulatory agencies' asymmetric regulation policies is the
presence or absence of significant market power on
the part of AT&T. The weight of the evidence considered herein overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that AT&T does not possess significant market
power in the interexchange market. The various
studies and indicia reviewed paint a consistent picture of a firm that faces very effective competition.
As a result, the recent decision by the FCC to declare AT&T to be "nondominant" is thoroughly
supported on economic grounds.
We have also considered several other competitive
concerns that have arisen over the years regarding
likely market performance under a more relaxed,
symmetric regulatory policy. Here, too, the evidence
strongly suggests that such residual concerns do not
support a continuation of the classification of AT&T
as a dominant firm or the continuation of a regulatory scheme which applies more stringent rules to
AT&T than to its competitors. The market conditions that exist for interexchafnge services simply are
not conducive to the sort of behavior that these concerns must postulate. Moreover, actual market experience also demonstrates that the feared consequences
of relaxed regulation have not and will not materialize. Therefore, both economic theory and empirical
evidence support the FCC's decision to cease classifying AT&T as a dominant carrier. This evidence
further demonstrates that no principled basis exists
for the continuation of remaining asymmetrical regulatory policies of interexchange carriers at both the
federal and state level.
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FIGURE 1
Long-Distance Firms Purchasing Equal Access
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FIGURE 2
Output of AT&T's Competitors
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FIGURE 3
Deployment of Interexchange Company Fiber-Miles
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